How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can prevent attacks against the ESC1 attack vector

Attacks on Microsoft certification authorities can be aimed at exploiting authorizations on certificate templates. In many cases, certificate templates must be configured to grant the applicant the right to apply for any identities. This can lead to the attacker taking over the identities of Active Directory accounts and subsequently to the elevation of rights. Attacks of this type are known in the security scene as "ESC1" is labeled.

Continue reading „Wie das TameMyCerts Policy Modul für Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) Angriffe gegen den ESC1 Angriffsvektor verhindern kann“

How the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) can help secure scenarios with Microsoft Intune and other Mobile Device Management (MDM) systems

Companies use Mobile Device Management (MDM) Products for managing, configuring and updating mobile devices such as smartphones, tablet computers or desktop systems via the Internet (over-the-air, OTA).

Common mobile device management products are:

Continue reading „Wie das TameMyCerts Policy Modul für Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) dabei helfen kann, Szenarien mit Microsoft Intune und anderen Mobile Device Management (MDM) Systemen abzusichern“

Automatically enter DNS names in the Subject Alternate Name (SAN) of issued certificates - with the TameMyCerts Policy Module for Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS)

Google is a major player with the Chromium project and products based on it such as Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge have moved to implement the RFC 2818 and to no longer trust certificates that no longer fulfill this requirement.

For us, the following sentence is of great explosiveness:

If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818
Continue reading „DNS-Namen automatisch in den Subject Alternate Name (SAN) ausgestellter Zertifikate eintragen – mit dem TameMyCerts Policy Modul für Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS)“

Change the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of a certificate before it is issued - but do it securely!

In net circulate unfortunately much at many Instructions (also the big players are not excluded from this, not even Microsoft itself or the Grand Master Komar), which fatally recommend that the flag EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 should be set on the certification authority - supposedly to be able to issue certificates with Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension for manually submitted certificate requests.

Unfortunately, this procedure is not only unnecessary, it also has some unpleasant side effects, which in the worst case can help an attacker to take over the entire Active Directory structure.

Continue reading „Den Subject Alternative Name (SAN) eines Zertifikats vor dessen Ausstellung verändern – aber sicher!“

Signing certificates bypassing the certification authority - solely using built-in tools

In the article "Signing certificates bypassing the certification authority"I described how an attacker with administrative rights on the certification authority can generate a logon certificate for administrative accounts of the domain by bypassing the certification authority software, i.e. by directly using the private key of the certification authority.

In the previous article I described the PSCertificateEnrollment Powershell Module is used to demonstrate the procedure. Microsoft supplies with certreq and certutil However, perfectly suitable pentesting tools are already included with the operating system ex works.

Continue reading „Signieren von Zertifikaten unter Umgehung der Zertifizierungsstelle – allein mit Bordmitteln“

Signing certificates bypassing the certification authority

Time and again in discussions about the security of a certification authority, it comes up that abuse of the certification authority could be contained by its security settings.

However, the fact that the integrity of a certification authority is directly tied to its key material and can therefore also be compromised by it is not obvious at first glance.

one must think of the certification authority software as a kind of management around the key material. For example, the software provides a Online interface for Certificate Enrollment takes care of the authentication of the enrollees, the automated execution of signature operations (issuing certificates and Brevocation lists) and their logging (Certification Authority Database, Audit log, Event log).

However, signature operations require nothing more than the private key of the certification authority. The following example shows how an attacker, given access to the certification authority's private key, can generate and issue certificates without the certification authority software and its security mechanisms being aware of this.

With such a certificate, it would even be possible in the worst case, take over the Active Directory forest undetected.

Continue reading „Signieren von Zertifikaten unter Umgehung der Zertifizierungsstelle“

Configuring a Certificate Template for Domain Controllers

Even with a certificate template for domain controllers that is supposedly simple to configure, there are a few things to keep in mind.

Continue reading „Konfigurieren einer Zertifikatvorlage für Domänencontroller“

Attack vector on Active Directory directory service via smartcard logon mechanism

In simple terms, public key cryptography can be reduced to the assumption that the private part of each key pair is known only to its owner.

A certification authority is responsible for the correct identification of users, computers or resources. Its issued certificates are therefore granted a trust status because all participants assume that their private key is known only to it.

If an attacker succeeds in gaining knowledge of a certification authority's private key, or at least Perform signatures using the private key, the integrity of the certification authority is no longer guaranteed.

Continue reading „Angriffsvektor auf den Active Directory Verzeichnisdienst über den Smartcard Logon Mechanismus“
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