Anyone who wants to use the smartcard logon function in their company would be well advised to ensure that their certification authority has the strongest possible security hardening. This includes some essential measures:
- Removing all unnecessary certification authority certificates from the NTAuthCertificates object in Active Directory: Each certification authority located in this store is authorized to issue smartcard logon certificates in Active Directory for the complete forest.
- Use qualified subordinationRestricting the certification authority certificates so that they are only trusted for the extended key usages actually issued. In the event of a compromise of the certification authority, the damage is then limited to these extended key usages. The "Smart Card Logon" Extended Key Usage would then only be present in the certification authority certificate of the certification authority that actually issues such certificates.
What is interesting about these thoughts, however, is that the domain controllers do not check the extended key usages at all when logging in via smartcard.
Continue reading „Domänencontroller überprüfen erweiterte Schlüsselverwendung (Extended Key Usage) bei Smartcard Anmeldung nicht“